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We examine the notion of “arousal”, an influential notion in affective science referring 
to the degree of an individual’s “activation” or “excitement” during an emotional state. 
We examine this notion specifically in relation to interoception, defined broadly as 
“sensitivity to stimuli arising inside the organism”. We first distinguish “physiological 
arousal” from “experienced arousal” and argue that both need to be characterised 
more broadly than commonly done. Physiological arousal does not reduce to 
sympathetic activation, as it involves complex interactions between multiple 
functionally distinct pathways within sympathetic and parasympathetic divisions of 
the autonomic nervous system, as well as endocrine and immune systems, and even 
the gut microbiota. Relatedly, experienced arousal does not reduce to the perception 
of changes in the body sensed by visceral afferents in response to autonomic 
nervous system activity, but also includes humorally mediated interoceptive 
pathways, somatic sensations of various kinds, and “background” bodily feelings.  
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“Arousal” is a key notion in the interdisciplinary field of “affective science”, which 
includes primarily the psychology and neuroscience of emotion, but also 
philosophical and computational approaches to emotion (Davidson et al., 2003, 
Scarantino, forthcoming). Roughly and preliminarily, we can say that “arousal” refers 
to how more or less “excited” or “activated” one is during an emotion; for example, 
someone who is very scared is often said to be highly aroused, whereas sadness 
and contentment are often regarded as involving low degrees of arousal. Several 
affective scientists regard arousal not just as an important dimension of emotion, but 
even as a necessary one: part of what it is to be in an emotional state is to be more 
or less aroused (e.g., Russell, 2003). Importantly for the topic of this volume, arousal 
is often regarded as interlinked with interoception.  
 
But what is it to be aroused during an emotion, exactly? As it turns out, no short 
definition can capture the various meanings that the term “arousal” has in affective 
science; moreover, these different meanings are often not clearly discriminated 
(Colombetti & Kuppens, forthcoming). One goal of this chapter is to bring some 
clarity by distinguishing the two main meanings of this term, i.e., what we call 
physiological and experienced arousal.1 Another goal is to clarify the relationship 
between these two meanings of arousal, and interoception, understood broadly as 
“sensitivity to stimuli arising inside the organism” - where “sensitivity” does not 
necessarily entail conscious perception. In particular, we argue that it is restrictive 
and inaccurate to reduce physiological arousal to a single dimension of sympathetic 
activation, or even to just autonomic activation2 (psychological studies that include 
                                                          
1 In this chapter we limit our analysis to arousal as a component or dimension of 
emotion and other affective states, such as moods. 
2 “Autonomic activation” commonly refers to activation of the autonomic nervous 
system (ANS). The ANS is a division of the peripheral nervous system, and is itself 
divided into sympathetic and parasympathetic nervous system. The other two 
divisions of the peripheral nervous system are the somatic nervous system, which 
controls the voluntary muscles and more generally the musculoskeletal system, and 
the enteric nervous system, which both alone and together with the ANS controls 
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“physiological measurements”, for example, often measure only a few dimensions of 
autonomic activation, such as skin conductance responses, heart rate and blood 
pressure; see Fox, 2008, pp. 32-34). As for experienced arousal, we argue, 
relatedly, that it is restrictive and inaccurate to reduce it to the conscious perception 
of organismic changes signalled just via visceral afferents (the afferent partner of the 
ANS). Experienced arousal, we suggest, additionally includes the perception of 
circulating substances mediated via humoral interoceptive pathways, as well as 
various somatic sensations and what we call “background bodily feelings”.    
 
2. Two main meanings of “arousal” 
 
In contemporary affective science, “arousal” has two main meanings. First, it refers 
to what we term experienced arousal, i.e., the lived, first-personal or subjective 
experience of being (more or less) aroused during an emotion. Second, it refers to 
what we term physiological arousal, i.e., the third-personal or objective biological 
processes that occur in the organism during an emotion. These two meanings of 
arousal are clearly different, but they are sometimes conflated, and it is often 
assumed that experienced arousal provides veridical information about physiological 
arousal. For example, Scherer & Wallbott (1994) addressed the question of whether 
at least some emotions exhibit the same patterns of “physiological symptoms” (their 
term) across cultures. To do this, they used questionnaires that asked participants 
how they felt their body when experiencing various emotions, but did not actually 
record any physiological measurements. Likewise, Grewe et al. (2007) studied 
“physiological responses” to music with questionnaires asking participants to “report 
their perceived bodily reactions” (p. 779). They actually also measured physiological 
responses to music in the form of skin conductance and facial muscle activity. 
Throughout the paper, however, they conflate “physiological changes” with “reported 
(or experienced) physiological changes”. More recently, Nummenmaa et al. (2014) 
identified different “bodily sensations maps” for 13 different emotions. Although they 
make it clear that this study was about experienced arousal, they assume throughout 
their paper that bodily sensations “represent” (their term) physiological processes.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
activity within the gastrointestinal tract. Until recently the enteric nervous system was 




How experienced arousal relates to physiological arousal, however, needs to be 
assessed empirically. Suppose you are feeling very agitated (experienced arousal) 
as part of being worried about an imminent job interview. Your feeling of agitation 
may include specific sensations such as feeling your heart pounding heavily in your 
chest, and your mouth and throat being dry. Now, it is natural and not implausible in 
this case to think that your heart is in fact beating differently from when you are 
calmer, and that your mouth and throat are in fact drier (physiological arousal). 
Whether this is really the case, however, needs to be confirmed by conducting actual 
measurements on the state of your heart, mouth and throat. One cannot simply infer 
the physiological condition of any specific body part from how the person feels, for a 
variety of reasons. One is that the person’s reports of her bodily feelings may be 
influenced by “social schemata” (Rimé et al., 1990), i.e., learnt templates of how one 
is expected to feel in specific situations. Another reason is that there are individual 
differences in how accurately people can perceive their actual bodily changes 
(usually measured with heartbeat detection tasks) - a capacity termed “interoceptive 
accuracy” (Garfinkel et al., 2015). Furthermore, the same person can be more or 
less accurate depending on the task performed, context, stress, etc. (Schulz et al., 
2013). Finally, even though some of us can, at times, accurately feel what is going 
on in some parts of our body, there is much going on in our body that is consciously 
inaccessible (Critchley & Harrison, 2013). For example, we cannot feel our pupils 
dilating or our blood pressure rising. Thus, how bodily aroused a person feels 
(experienced arousal) provides at best only a partial look into her physiological 
arousal. At worst, it provides an inaccurate or distorted view of the latter. 
 
The upshot is that we need to distinguish clearly between the subjective experience, 
or feeling, of being aroused, excited or activated (all terms found in the literature and 
used as synonyms), and what is actually going on in the organism during an 
emotional episode. Having clarified this, let us now examine both phenomena more 
closely.  
 




That our organism often undergoes physiological changes during emotional 
episodes is something we can easily witness, and often do: we see our hands 
shaking when we are nervous, and a mirror can show our skin getting red when we 
are embarrassed. This is such a commonplace observation that it is not surprising to 
find it in ancient philosophy texts. At the beginning of De Anima, for example, 
Aristotle noted that in “anger, mildness, fear, pity, hope and even joy and love and 
hating … the body is affected in some way” (1986, p. 128). The Stoics and Galen 
also recognised the contribution of the body to our emotional states (Gill, 2010).  
 
There is thus a sense in which we have always known that our body gets more or 
less “excited” during different emotions. It is worth noting, though, that contemporary 
empirical studies of emotion typically measure physiological arousal by measuring 
something very specific, i.e., changes in the organism ascribed (sometimes 
incorrectly) to activation of the sympathetic division of the ANS, such as increases in 
heart rate and skin conductance, alterations in skin temperature, and pupillary 
dilation (Berntson & Cacioppo, 2009).3 Walter Cannon famously associated the 
sympathetic nervous system with the “fight or flight response”, and the narrow 
identification of physiological arousal with sympathetic activation can be traced back 
to work on fear and rage he conducted in the 1910s and 1920s (Cannon, 1929). 
Cannon also conceptualised sympathetic activation as mutually exclusive with, and 
antagonistic to, activation of the parasympathetic system, whose contribution to 
emotion he generally disregarded. Finally, Cannon is also responsible for 
characterising sympathetic activation as generally uniform and undifferentiated. 
Though these ideas were challenged by Cannon’s contemporaries (see Dror, 2014), 
they influenced scientific conceptions of arousal throughout the 20th century, and still 
do so. Most famously, Schachter & Singer (1962, pp. 381-382) maintained that the 
same state of (sympathetic) physiological arousal (induced using an adrenaline 
injection) “could be labelled ‘joy’ or ‘fury’ or ‘jealousy’ or any of a great diversity of 
emotional labels depending on the cognitive aspects of the situation”. These authors 
also suggested (despite previous studies to the contrary, e.g., Ax, 1953; Wolf & 
Wolff, 1947), that “emotional states may … be generally characterized by a high 
                                                          
3 Acute increases in heart rate and pupil size are actually initiated by a withdrawal in 
parasympathetic tone (Robinson et al., 1966; Barbur, 2004). 
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level of sympathetic activation with few if any physiological distinguishers among the 
many emotional states” (Schachter & Singer, 1962, pp. 397).  
 
Our view is that this conception of arousal during emotion is superseded and too 
narrow, and needs to be abandoned, for the following four reasons.  
 
(1) The term “autonomic nervous system” and its division into sympathetic and para- 
(meaning “by the side of”, “alongside”) sympathetic components was introduced by 
Langley (1900) on the basis of predominantly neuroanatomical, rather than 
functional, considerations. To talk of global sympathetic and parasympathetic 
functions (e.g., fight-and-flight vs. rest-and-digest) has the potential to generate 
misunderstandings and to create an overly simplistic impression of the functional 
architecture of the ANS (for more details, see Harrison et al., 2013). For example, 
empirical data acquired over the last half-century show that pre- and postganglionic 
neurons of both the sympathetic and parasympathetic nervous system link together 
in multiple functionally distinct pathways that facilitate the generation of a huge 
variety of highly differentiated and specific responses (Jänig, 2006). This has 
undermined previous false assumptions that sympathetic preganglionic neurons 
diverge widely and synapse with postganglionic neurons with multiple diverse 
functions, dispelling the belief that the sympathetic nervous system operates in a 
monolithic all-or-nothing fashion. This research also demonstrates that the ANS can 
support emotion-specific physiological patterning.  
 
(2) A consideration that invites broadening the traditional conception of physiological 
arousal is that autonomic activation is also influenced by afferent (from periphery to 
brain) neural and humoral feedback pathways (for details see Critchley & Harrison, 
2013). Visceral afferent fibres innervate almost all tissues of the body and fall into 
two broad groups: firstly, those that carry motivational information, e.g., hunger, 
satiety, thirst, nausea, and respiratory sensations, and travel mainly along cranial, 
e.g., vagus and glossopharyngeal, nerves to terminate within the nucleus of the 
solitary tract; secondly, spinal visceral afferents that project to the dorsal horns of the 
spinal cord and, via spinal laminar 1, into the spinothalamic tract. These fibres tend 
to have a more prominent role in signalling tissue damage. Humoral feedback is 
largely processed through the circumventricular organs (regions of the brain that lack 
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a normal blood-brain barrier), though some - e.g., core temperature, glucose, and 
insulin - can also be sensed directly within brain regions such as the hypothalamus. 
Additionally, inflammatory mediators can modulate brain function through microglial 
transduction pathways, resulting in a wave of microglial activation that propagates 
across the brain (Rivest, 2009; Saper et al., 2012). Efferent activation is continuously 
modulated by this afferent, “interoceptive” feedback, so that it is misleading to restrict 
autonomic arousal occurring during emotion only to the outcome of neural efferent 
processes, without including the continuous regulatory afferent feedback that co-
occurs with those processes.  
 
(3) A further and partly related challenge to narrow conceptions of physiological 
arousal comes from psychoneuroendocrinology and psychoneuroimmunology. 
Developments in these fields have shown that the central and peripheral nervous 
system bi-directionally interact with both endocrine and immune processes, and that 
these interactions influence, and are influenced by, our emotional states. We know 
for example that the stress response includes the release of hormones from the 
brain into the adrenal glands and the bloodstream, which in turn influence 
hypothalamic-pituitary activity in the brain (Charmandari et al., 2005; Spiga et al., 
2015). We also know that, during illness, the immune system produces pro-
inflammatory proteins (cytokines) that influence brain activity (Harrison, 2017) and 
that appear to play a contributory role in at least some patients with depression 
(Dantzer et al., 2008); in turn, the brain responds by sending signals to inhibit this 
inflammatory process (Tracey, 2002). Given this bidirectional interactivity, in our view 
it is arbitrary to identify arousal with activation of any one system alone (the ANS, the 
endocrine system, etc.), or of any subset of it. Bidirectional interactivity also implies 
that it would still be arbitrary to regard the ANS (or any other system alone) as the 
“most relevant” or “most basic” arousal system, with the other systems making only a 
“peripheral contribution” to arousal.4 The existence of reciprocal influences entails 
that the systems involved are coupled, such that, without additional criteria or 
reasons, no system alone can be picked out as the one having the causally most 
relevant role. In the presence of this complexity, we think it more plausible to regard 
the combined activity of all systems involved as constituting physiological arousal.    
                                                          




The reason why endocrine and immune changes are generally not included in 
definitions of physiological arousal may have to do with the widespread assumption, 
in affective science, that emotions are short-lived episodes that involve brief but 
intense changes in the body. Changes in the endocrine and immune systems are 
typically regarded to unfold on a longer timeframe, and thus arguably do not qualify 
as candidates for arousal. Indeed, sometimes arousal in emotion is explicitly 
characterised as “phasic” (temporary, short-lived; see, e.g., Fowles, 2009, p. 50), 
which excludes longer-lasting physiological processes (see also Bradley & Lang, 
2007, p. 601). But it is not obvious that emotions are always short lived: whereas 
sometimes we are upset, annoyed or scared for a few seconds or minutes, we are 
also often upset, annoyed or scared (as well as jealous, envious, angry, happy, and 
so on) for hours or even longer. Arousal, in the latter cases, may well involve 
physiological processes that unfold and change over hours or even days. Moreover, 
it's not just emotions, defined as short-lived affective episodes, that involve a certain 
level of arousal; moods, often characterised as lasting longer than emotions, also do 
(see Thayer, 1996). Perhaps, one might suggest, the main difference between 
emotions and moods is precisely that, in the former, physiological arousal 
corresponds to brief patterns of activation of the ANS, whereas in the latter it also 
involves longer-lasting endocrine and immune changes.5 This is in part, of course, 
an empirical question. Yet, importantly, emotions typically occur in the context of a 
mood that makes some emotions more likely than others (e.g., one is more likely to 
get angry at someone when in an irritable mood); the physiological profile of a 
certain mood is thus likely to affect the one of these emotions, so that short-lived 
activation of the ANS would occur in a specific endocrine and immune context, which 
should then be regarded as part and parcel of the physiological arousal profile of the 
emotions in question.  
 
(4) Yet another challenge to narrow conceptions of physiological arousal comes from 
research on the bacteria that live in our organism. They are found in almost all parts 
of the body, with the highest concentration in the guts. The human guts contain 
nearly 1014-1015 bacteria, which is 10-100 times the number of eukaryotic cells of the 
                                                          
5 Thanks again to an anonymous reviewer for raising this possibility.  
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human organism (1013). The many different functions of these bacteria have only 
begun to be revealed. Importantly, we now know that they influence, and are 
influenced by, the central nervous system, along the so-called “microbiota-gut-brain” 
axis. Particularly relevant for present purposes is recent evidence indicating that 
stress-related mood disorders, such as anxiety and depression, alter the composition 
of gut bacteria, and that, in turn, the composition of gut bacteria influences those 
states (for reviews, see Cryan & Dinan, 2012; Foster & McVey Neufeld, 2013; Mayer 
et al., 2014). In a landmark study on mice, Sudo et al. (2004) showed that gut 
microbiota influence the development of the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal system, 
responsible for the endocrine response to stress. Since then, further evidence has 
been gathered indicating that, in humans too, microbiota influence brain processes 
and behaviours relevant to anxiety-related stress disorders, and even individuals’ 
susceptibility to depression (see reviews listed above for references). This influence 
appears to occur via neural, hormonal, and immune routes: many of the effects of 
gut microbiota on brain and behaviour are dependent on activation of visceral 
afferents travelling in the vagus nerve; gut microbiota also generate 
neurotransmitters and neuromodulators known to influence mood, such as GABA, 
serotonin, noradrenaline, dopamine and acetylcholine; and gut microbiota can also 
influence circulating levels of pro-inflammatory cytokines produced by innate immune 
cells, which, as we saw, affect brain function. Less is known about the relation 
between microbiota and short-lived emotions, but given the influence of moods on 
the latter, microbiota are likely to influence them as well.   
 
Conceptually, this body of work raises the question of where the natural boundaries 
of physiological arousal lie: what is the physical entity that gets aroused? The more 
conservative answer is that physiological arousal recruits subsystems and processes 
of the organism “traditionally conceived” (i.e., formed by cells with the same DNA), 
and that gut microbiota are different living forms (cells with different DNA) that 
causally influence those subsystems and processes. In other words, bacteria are not 
part of the organism, and thus not of physiological arousal either; rather they 
constitute an external context that modulates, and is modulated by, the organism 
“proper”. A less intuitive, yet arguably more coherent, answer is that gut microbiota 
can be constitutive parts of the physiological arousal that characterises affective 
processes. The reasoning is the same we applied earlier to the recognition of the 
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existence of reciprocal influences between the sympathetic and parasympathetic 
system, and more generally between the central nervous system (CNS), ANS, 
endocrine and immune system: given the complex mutual relations interconnecting 
all these systems and the gut microbiota, it is arguably conceptually problematic and 
even arbitrary to maintain that only processes of the organism traditionally conceived 
can constitute physiological arousal, and that microbial processes are mere external 
factors or extrinsic (non-constitutive) causes. Rather, it seems more coherent to 
regard microbiotic processes as constitutive of physiological arousal.  
 
In sum, together these four sets of considerations indicate that it is misleading to 
regard physiological arousal during an emotion as a temporary upsurge from a 
baseline state of “non-aroused physiology” of the organism traditionally conceived. 
Our physiology (i.e., the totality of the processes that contribute to sustaining our 
living condition) is continuously changing and shifting, with the CNS influencing, and 
being influenced by, a multitude of processes taking place at many different 
timescales in the (various divisions of) the peripheral nervous system, the endocrine 
and immune systems, and even beyond them.  
 
4. Experienced arousal  
 
Let us now take a closer look at the notion of experienced, or subjective, arousal. 
Again, we can begin by noting that there is nothing surprising or controversial in 
claiming that during some emotions we feel more agitated or excited than during 
others. Indeed, that emotions can vary in how upset or excited one feels was noted 
long before the birth of modern psychology. Just to mention a few examples, the 
Stoics distinguished the “passions” from the “good emotions”, where the former are 
intense and overwhelming, and the latter are calm and under control (Graver, 2007). 
Later, and possibly under the influence of the Stoics, in his Treatise of Human 
Nature (1739-40 [2003]) David Hume distinguished the violent passions from the 
calm ones. The calm passions include the moral sentiments and the aesthetic sense, 
which cause “no disorder in the soul” (Treatise, 2.3.3.8) and are known more by their 
effects than by any immediate feeling; the violent passions (love, hate, grief, joy, 





As for contemporary affective science, Jim Russell for example characterises 
arousal as “one’s sense of mobilization and energy” (Russell, 2003, p. 148). 
Similarly, Fox (2008, p. 120) writes that “arousal or activation are often interpreted as 
the amount of energy we feel we have available”. A recent neuroscientific paper 
defines arousal as “the degree of activation experienced during an instance of 
emotion, ranging from calm to excited” (Kragel & LaBar, 2016, p. 445). 
 
Whereas it is relatively uncontroversial to say that we feel more or less activated 
during an emotion, it is surprisingly hard to specify what it is to feel more or less 
activated, energised, mobilised, and/or under the control of a “turbulent passion”. A 
common view (consistent with the popular identification, discussed in the previous 
section, of “physiological arousal” with autonomic or even sympathetic activation) is 
to characterise experienced arousal as the conscious perception of bodily changes 
induced by the ANS.7 On this view, to feel aroused during an episode of fear, for 
example, is to feel one’s own heart beating fast, or one’s own skin sweating 
profusely or changing temperature (famously, this view was originally proposed by 
James, 1884; it is still influential today, see e.g. references at the beginning of 
section 2). 
 
Intuitively, it indeed seems to be the case that these sensations contribute to feeling 
aroused during an emotion, and also that they contribute to the felt intensity of 
arousal: the more (less, respectively) one feels certain parts of one’s body, the more 
(less) aroused one feels. By analogy, at first glance at least, this appears to be what 
happens when one feels sexually aroused, which partly involves feeling changes in 
erogenous areas of the body controlled by the ANS: the “more” one feels those 
                                                          
6 See Dixon (2003) for a historical overview of other philosophical accounts that 
distinguished the “unruly passions” from the calmer “affects” or “affections”.  
7 In the rest of the chapter we call these, for lack of a better term, visceral sensations 
“of autonomic origin” or “due to the ANS”, to distinguish them from other visceral 
sensations due to the interoception of substances circulating in the blood stream (as 
described in section 3). 
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areas, the more sexually aroused one feels.8 Similarly, it would seem, in the case of 
arousal during an emotion. Moreover, the more aroused one feels, the less in control 
one feels; the traditionally recognised overwhelming character of a passion, in other 
words, appears to owe much to the uncontrollable nature of visceral sensations of 
autonomic origin. Finally, in addition to contributing to the intensity of experienced 
arousal, these sensations also appear to contribute to the intensity of an emotional 
experience. Back in 1964, Schachter had already proposed that experienced arousal 
contributes to felt emotional intensity. Relatedly, Wiens et al. (2000) showed that 
subjects who are better at perceiving their physiological arousal and report more 
subjective arousal, also experience emotions more intensely. 
 
In our view, this is a plausible but still partial account of what it is to feel aroused 
during an emotion. Similarly to the case of physiological arousal discussed in the 
previous section, to regard experienced arousal as constituted only by sensations of 
bodily changes induces by the ANS is too narrow, and does not account for other 
ways in which we can feel aroused during an emotion; in particular: 1) some visceral 
sensations are due to the interoception of substances circulating in the bloodstream; 
2) non-visceral somatic sensations also contribute to feeling aroused; and 3) 
experienced arousal also appears to involve conscious experiences that are not 
feelings of bodily changes. We already discussed the first point briefly in section 3, 
point (2). Here we consider the other two points in turn.  
 
1) William James (1884) already noted that emotional experience also involves the 
perception of bodily changes mediated by the somatic nervous system (the division 
of the peripheral nervous system that controls the musculoskeletal system; see note 
2). We can call there “somatic sensations”. Important somatic sensations that 
contribute to feeling aroused come from facial expressions (smiling, frowning, 
pouting, grinning, and so on) and from bodily posture, and also include felt urges to 
act in specific ways. For example, feeling angry and anxious often involves the 
conscious perception of one’s tense facial muscles (such as tense jaws and/or 
forehead) and other bodily muscles (especially in the upper back, neck and 
                                                          
8 But note that feelings of sexual arousal are likely mediated by a combination of 
visceral and somatic afferents. 
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shoulders); feeling sad often involves feeling one’s drooping jaws and eye corners, 
slouched posture, and so on.   
 
In addition, feeling aroused during an emotion often involves the experience of 
wanting to move one way or the other (felt urges to act). This experience partly 
constitutes the motivational aspect of emotion. For example, during an aggressive 
face-to-face confrontation, we may experience wanting to shout at, or even 
physically attack, the person we are angry at. Most of the time in this kind of scenario 
we repress our outward behaviour because of social rules; yet even if we do not 
assail the opponent, the urge to do so is there, and is felt in one’s own body tensing 
up, preparing to attack and restraining itself. Note that, especially in the moment, we 
may not be able to clearly discriminate these felt urges to act from other types of 
sensations (e.g., the angry person may also feel her heart pounding hard). Similar 
considerations readily apply to experiences of fear, great joy, contempt, pride, 
jealousy, and many others. In affective science, the term that best captures this 
aspect of emotion experience is action readiness awareness (Frijda, 1986, pp. 231-
240). “Action readiness”, as the word indicates, refers to a state of being ready to act 
in a certain way. The awareness of this state is a bodily feeling, in the sense that it 
involves the conscious perception of one’s own body, constituted by proprioceptive 
sensations of position, and state of tension or calmness. As in the case of visceral 
sensations of autonomic origin, felt urges to act appear to contribute significantly to 
experienced arousal during an emotion, and also to the intensity of the emotion: e.g., 
the more I want to shout at someone, the more aroused, agitated or upset I feel as 
part of my experience of anger, and arguably also the “more angry” or “more 
intensely angry” I feel.  
 
2) The other reason why experienced arousal during emotion cannot be reduced to 
perception of bodily changes due to the ANS is that it arguably includes also 
conscious states that are not feelings of bodily changes. This possibility splits into 
two: (i) experienced arousal includes non-bodily experiences, i.e., experiences with 
no “bodily phenomenology”; (ii) experienced emotional arousal involves bodily 
feelings that are not feelings of the body, but feelings of the world shaped through 
bodily self-awareness; here, experienced emotional arousal does include bodily 




According to (i), it is possible to be highly aroused during an emotion without feeling 
one’s own body. Mostly philosophers supporting a cognitivist view of emotions tend 
to make this claim. For example, Claire Armon-Jones (1986, p. 51) writes: “whether 
or not I feel any twinges or palpitations, if my thoughts are totally consumed by a 
‘strong desire for an object which I do not possess and which belongs to another, 
then I can be said to feel ‘extremely envious’ ”. On this view, one can be very worried 
that his child might have a life-threatening condition (for example) without 
experiencing any bodily sensation (neither visceral nor somatic). What constitutes 
feeling worried, here, is likely to be the conscious thoughts that one’s child may 
suffer and die young (say), with the frequency and disruptive character of these 
thoughts determining the level of experienced arousal. Uriah Kriegel’s (2015) recent 
account of emotional phenomenology also supports this possibility. In his view, 
emotional experience is reducible to a combination of cognitive, conative and 
algedonic (pain-pleasure) phenomenology, none of which, he argues, necessarily 
involves bodily feelings. He briefly suggests that conative phenomenology 
contributes to felt emotional intensity (p. 135), however not in virtue of any bodily 
sensation.  
 
Our view is that possibility (i) is implausible. Although it is the case that “cognitive 
phenomenology” (thoughts, predictions, memories) can constitute much of our 
experience of being aroused during an emotion, it is not clear to us that it is deprived 
of any bodily phenomenology. We think that cognitivist accounts of this sort overlook 
possibility (ii), i.e., the existence of bodily feelings that are not feelings of the body, 
but experiences of the body through which certain aspects of the world (one’s 
current situation, imagined future events, etc.) are experienced as emotionally salient 
(see also Colombetti 2014, chapter 5); because these bodily experiences are often 
subtle and inconspicuous, they can be mistaken for “purely mental” (Kriegel, 2015, p. 
89). To illustrate this second possibility, consider again Armon-Jones’s example of 
her experience of an alleged “non-bodily” envy. As she describes this case, she says 
that her thoughts “are totally consumed by a ‘strong desire for an object which I do 
not possess and which belongs to another’ ”, and that these thoughts exhaust her 
experience of envy. But it does not seem to be phenomenologically accurate to say 
that one can be “totally consumed” by a “strong desire” (note the intensity of the 
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described experience) for an object without any bodily phenomenology. Even if we 
grant that the desired object is quite abstract (e.g., respect and admiration, rather 
than a new modern kitchen) and that being “totally consumed” by a desire for it 
consists in cognitive rumination, it seems inaccurate to maintain that bodily feelings 
are entirely absent from this experience. In particular, we suggest that the 
experience of, e.g., envy, is shaped by inconspicuous background bodily feelings 
that “colour” what the person attends to in her thoughts and ruminations (much like 
looking through a coloured pair of lenses makes the world show up as coloured, 
while the lenses themselves are not noted, and are rather that through which the 
world appears tinted). These background bodily feelings may not be noted by the 
envious person, but they nevertheless contribute to feelings of tension and 
unpleasantness that, arguably, partly constitute the experience of envy described by 
Armon-Jones. In addition, emotional experiences typically take place in the context 
of more general mood experiences - such as feeling up or down, sluggish or 
energised, tense or calm (Thayer, 1996). These feelings, we propose, are bodily 
feelings that constitute a “background bodily phenomenology” against which the 
occurrent emotional experiences can stand out (in the foreground).9 So, even if one 
granted that, sometimes at least, emotional experiences include primarily “purely 
mental” cognitive or conative phenomenology, it would still be the case that bodily 
feelings constituting background moods shape and structure what is in the 
foreground. Taken together, these considerations complement, at the experiential 
level, the point we made in the previous section about the existence of several 
bidirectional pathways between brain and body, such that it does not seem possible 
to “silence” all sources of feedback from the body.  
 
4. Summary and conclusion 
 
In sum, then, in this chapter we have argued that the notion of arousal used in 
affective science needs to be characterised broadly, both at the physiological and 
experiential level, and cannot be reduced to narrow conceptions of interoception 
                                                          
9 See also Damasio (1999) for the related notion of “background feeling”, and 
Colombetti (2014, chapter 5) for a discussion of this and other notions of background 
bodily experiences.  
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limited to the perception (conscious and not) of ANS activation. At the physiological 
level, we need to move beyond Cannon’s (1929) and Schachter & Singer’s (1962) 
conceptualisation of arousal as a uniform pattern of sympathetic activation. The 
sympathetic and parasympathetic systems are complexly interrelated and work 
together to generate specific patterns of autonomic arousal; additionally, autonomic 
activity includes not just neural efferent processes, but is also influenced by afferent 
neural and humoral feedback. Third, autonomic activation does not happen in 
isolation from other bodily processes, rather it is complexly interrelated via 
bidirectional pathways with the CNS, and the endocrine and immune system. Fourth, 
we suggested that the notion of physiological arousal may be extended even beyond 
processes taking place within the organism traditionally conceived, so as to include 
(at least) those gut bacteria known to influence, and be influenced by, neural, 
endocrine, and immune processes relevant to emotions and moods.  
 
At the experiential level, we have argued that arousal cannot be reduced to visceral 
sensations of autonomic origin, but instead additionally includes perception of 
circulating substances mediated via humoral interoceptive pathways as well as 
specific somatic sensations: feedback from facial muscles and bodily posture, and 
felt urges to act (perception of muscle tension in preparation for action). We also 
proposed to regard “background bodily feelings” as constituting the experience of 
being aroused during emotion, where these are feelings in which bodily self-
awareness is present but is not conspicuous, and is best characterised as shaping 
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